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INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, & THE ONTARIO
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE REVIEW BOARD IN 1997
TODD JEFFREY WEILER*
ImsuMk
Cet essai 6tudie l'inddpendance juridique et institutionnelle de la Commission
de r6vision de l'aide sociale de l'Ontario (CRAS) dans le contexte d'une r6vision
4 grande dchelle du gouvernement conservateur des organismes, conseils et
commissions de la province. L'auteur aborde la th6orie juridique de
l'ind6pendance telle qu'interpr6te par les cours canadiennes et examine deux
th6ories conflictuelles en ce qui a trait a la trait k la prestation de l'aide
sociale. II arrive h la conclusion que, bien que le gouvernement soit certaine-
ment capable d'abolir l'inddpendance des jugements en mati6re des litiges
reli6s k I'aide sociale, tels que ceux dmis par le CRAS, il ferait aussi bien d'en
calculer les cofits politiques et juridiques avant de s'avancer inutilement sur un
terrain inconnu.
How it looks and acts are of course critical incidents to being independent,
but most important is how it feels. From a secure feeling of independence
comes the confidence to look and act independently, and, most signifi-
cantly, comes the capacity to educate interested actors and observers to dis-
tinguish between behaviour that threatens the heart of the system. In this
way, independence becomes the conductor of the whole justice symphony,
co-ordinating the players, redefining the sounds, and controlling the ulti-
mate product. What is the essence of independence, this concept that
demands hegemony over the justice system? It is the right to be free from
external control or influence, and the right to be seen that way.I
On October 31, 1996, the Ontario Labour Relations Board was asked by the
applicant union to hold the Chairman of the Ontario Cabinet's Management
Board, David Johnson, in contempt, and to declare itself incapable of adjudicat-
ing an on-going unfair labour practice complaint filed by Service Employees
BA, MA, LLB, Student-at-Law, Ogilvy Renault (Ottawa). This paper was originally
written for a law and social welfare course while the author was a student at the
Unviersity of Western Ontario Faculty of Law.
R.S. Abella, "The Independence of Administrative Tribunals" (1992) 26 Law Soc. Gaz.
113 at 113.
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Union International, Local 1587 against the Ontario Government (acting as an
employer), because the Board lacked institutional independence and was tainted
by a reasonable apprehension of bias.2 It was alleged that Mr. Johnson and the
Government of Ontario selected four Board Vice Chairs to be removed from
office before their terms had expired, that two replacement Vice Chairs were
appointed only at the pleasure of the Government (an unprecedented action),
that Johnson had made public remarks suggesting that he would review mem-
bership of the Board prior to this change, and that Vice Chairs would be beholden
to the government for future work as arbitrators (once their terms had expired).3
The government denied the accusations, asserting that the Chair of the Board
had selected which Vice Chairs would be removed from office. 4
Interestingly enough, the government's denial led to the actual reason why
the Board did declare itself incapable of continuing in this case, because of
a reasonable apprehension of bias. The denial involved an assertion of fact (i.e.
that it had been the Chair of the Board, not the Minister nor Cabinet, who had
decided which Vice Chairs would lose their positions) of which each possible
board decision-maker had personal knowledge. This is because Vice Chairs
meet regularly with the Chair to discuss Board administration, and at one of
those meetings, the removal of the four Vice Chairs had been discussed and
explained. Because this information, to which each Vice Chair was privy,
contradicted the information put forward by one, or both, of the parties to
the present application (the Board would not say), the Board declared itself
unable to proceed in adjudicating the application, because of a reasonable
apprehension of bias (in that its members each had personal knowledge of key
facts at issue).5
This declaration was made in spite of the arguments of the applicant union local,
which, ironically, had been left to contend that the Board should not declare
itself biased because it was privy to such information. Rather, the union local
wanted the Board to address the merits of the union's application to have the
Minister found in contempt, and for the Board to declare itself unable to proceed
in the unfair labour practice complaint because of a reasonable apprehension of
bias stemming from its lack of institutional independence (i.e. the Minister's
direct participation in the removal of the four Vice Chairs).
2. Ontario Realty Corp., [1996] O.L.R.D. No. 4189 (November 27 1996) (Walker) (QL).
3. Ibid. at para. 10.
4. Ibid. at para. 11.
5. Ibid. at para. 47-51.
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The experience of the Ontario Labour Relations Board may not be isolated to
that tribunal. In fact, the election of the current provincial government, in June
of 1995, leaves one to ponder the future of other independent, adjudicatory
boards. In this paper, I shall focus on the experience of the Ontario Social
Assistance Review Board ("SARB"). The SARB is a statutory quasi-judicial
tribunal6 that provides a de novo hearing of appeals of social assistance deter-
minations under the Ontario Family Benefits Act [the "FBA"],7 the Ontario
General Welfare Assistance Act [the "GWAA"], 8 and the Ontario Vocational
Rehabilitation Services Act [the "VRSA"]. 9
Given the current tumult evident in Ontario politics, the purpose of this essay
will be to consider the qualities of independence of the SARB as it is currently
configured, with an eye to the possible alternatives posited for it by members
of the Ontario Government. I will begin by explaining the Ontario Government's
current interest in reviewing the SARB. Next, I will consider the nature of
independence; apply it to the SARB; and consider the political context within
which it operates. I will then turn to two aspects of adjudicatory independence
- one relating to a tribunal's interaction with the executive/legislative branch
of state (through the appointment's process), and the other relating to a tribunal's
interaction with the judicial branch (through appeal or review of its decisions)
- to offer conclusions about the SARB (or its alternative) and its future as an
independent administrative tribunal.
6. The SARB is subject to the provisions of the Ontario Statutory Powers Procedures Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 [the "SPPA"], and is continued and configured under s. 15 of the
Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.20 [the
"MCSSA"].
7. RS.O. 1990, c. F.2, s. 14.
(6) Where, after a hearing, the board of review has reviewed the decision of the
Director, the board may,
(a) affirm the decision;
(b) rescind the decision and direct the Director to make any other decision
that the Director is authorised to make under this Act and the regulations and
as the board considers proper, and for such purpose the board may
substitute its opinion for the opinion of the Director, or
(c) refer the matter back to the Director for reconsideration in accordance
with such directions as the board considers proper under this Act and the
regulations.
8. R.S.O. 1990, c. G.6, s. 11.
9. R.S.O. 1990, c. V.5, s. 10.
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The WOOD COMMISSION
One of the commitments we made during the last election campaign was
that we would use all means possible to downsize the government and to
provide services at less cost or more efficiency. We think [that] privatisation
will be a big factor in that. 10
You very correctly raised the point of the existence of [the SARB] being at
issue, and it is very much at issue. We're going to look at whether or not
having this board is the most effective way of dealing with this problem [of
delivering social assistance adjudication in a fair, but economical, man-
ner].ll
In its Fall 1995 Economic Statement, the Conservative Government took steps
towards delivery on its promise to "downsize" by creating a commission, led
by M.P.P. Bob Wood, Legislative Assistant to David Johnson, Chairman of the
Management Board Secretariat, to undertake a detailed review of Ontario's
agencies, boards and commissions. 12 The Wood Commission, already well
underway before its terms of reference were drafted, completed its review of
adjudicative agencies - such as the SARB - and reported to Cabinet in
December 1996.13 At time of writing, the contents of the Commission's Report
had not yet been made public.
Interviews with knowledgeable parties, including the Chair himself, and the
recommendations published by the Commission thus far14 suggest that the
10. David Johnson, Ontario M.P.P., Chair of the Management Board of Cabinet, in: '"Tories
eye private firms for government services" Toronto Star (10 October 1995) Al.
Included in a list of possible targets for privatisation mentioned in this article was issu-
ance and control of welfare cheques.
11. Bob Wood, Ontario M.P.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Chair of the Management
Board of Cabinet, Chair of the Review Commission examining Agencies, Boards and
Commissions, speaking to Maureen Adams, (then) Chair of the SARB, in: Ontario,
Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Government Agencies, "Social Assis-
tance Review Board" in Debates, No. A-8 (7 February 1996) at 136.
12. Ontario, Ministry of Finance, 1995 Fiscal and Economic Statement (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1995) at 15.
13. Bob Wood, M.P.P., telephone interview (2 April 1996); Office of Bob Wood, M.P.P.,
telephone interview (29 January 1997).
14. The second phase of the Government Task Force on Agencies, Boards and Commis-
sions, which produced a January 29 1997 Report on 62 Operational Agencies, included
recommendations to:eliminate 12 operational agencies over the next two years; rede-
sign the way 30 agencies deliver their services, including immediate privatization of the
Metro Toronto Convention Centre, Ontario Place Corporation, and Ortech Corporation;
review 14 agencies to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
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Wood Commission was not circumspect in its review of adjudicatory agencies.
Rather, it is quite possible that wholesale change may be in store for the
adjudication of social assistance appeals. Illustrative of what the Commission
may recommend is an alternative posited by Chairman Wood himself. 15 While
stressing that this alternative has not yet been endorsed by him, 16 the Commis-
sion, or the Government, Wood suggested that the Government might entrench
a level of administrative appeal within the social benefits bureaucracy 17 ; con-
tract-out further appeals to a private arbitrator; and create a higher level of
administrative appeals court to hear appeals from the new, private arbitrator, as
well as from a number of other different administrative regimes (such as
Workers' Compensation). A further, limited appeal might also lie to the Ontario
Divisional Court18 - but only with regard to matters such as those involving
application of the Charter of Rights. 19 This scheme is the alternative which will
be considered in this paper.
INDEPENDENCE
Independence may be characterised as the relative autonomy of a decision-
maker to exercise her discretion free of constraint. Independence is a "critical"
means of ensuring the public perception of an adjudicator's impartiality.20
15. Supra, note 13.
16. Wood's opinion of the existing mechanism was illustrated by his having put the same
question to the Chair of the SARB, Maureen Adams, six times, in a recent review of the
SARB by the Ontario Legislature Standing Committee on Procedural Affairs: "Do you
see any reason why what this board does couldn't be done by a Small Claims Court
Judge?" Supra, note 11 at 145.
17. This level of appeal would apparently be implemented by each municipal social ser-
vices department (who are soon to be responsible for the delivery of general welfare
assistance and family benefits allowance, as they are presently known) despite the fact
that no such administrative structure, or expertise, necessarily exists in each municipal-
ity).
18. Whether this rather complicated, hypothetical, regime meets with Premier Mike Harris'
stated goal is an open question. See: M. Harris, "Welfare Should Offer a Hand Up, Not
a Hand Out" Policy Options (May 1995) 33 at 34. "A fundamental restructuring of the
welfare distribution system will also be required as a key component of welfare reform.
Decentralisation and delayering [sic.] of the decision-making process will be essential."
19. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
20. R. v. Lippe, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114; 64 C.C.C. (3d) 513 at 530. See also: R. v. Valente,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673; 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 204-5; "[b]oth independence and
impartiality are fundamental not only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case
but also to individual and public confidence in the administration of justice. Without
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Impartiality has been referred to as a practical condition for the actualisation of
the rule of law. "If a dispute is to be governed by general rules, the rules must
be impartially interpreted and applied."' 21 While not courts,22 independent
administrative agencies are nonetheless expected, and required, to exercise their
jurisdiction in a manner free of all influence or political pressure.
23
Where a tribunal is undertaking an essentially adjudicative task [i.e. the making
of an individualised decision through application of general standards to deter-
minations of fact] 24 there needs to be the greatest concern for independence.
Here, the analogy to the judiciary is most appropriate. That is not to say that the
precise methods of the judiciary have to be adopted, but that structural measures,
somewhat analogous to those applied to the judiciary, need to be adopted to
ensure that, in actuality and in public perception, administrative tribunal adju-
dication is made on an independent basis.25
In interpreting language guarantees under s. 133 of the Constitution Act 1867,26
the Supreme Court of Canada has recently acknowledge the strong similarities
between adjudicative administrative agencies and courts, and the significant role
of such agencies in the provision of administrative justice.27 This acknowledge-
ment is useful in that it encourages the use of jurisprudence concerning judicial
independence and impartiality in application (or, at least, by analogy) to cases
of administrative adjudication. Moreover, much like public faith in the judicial
that confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance that are essen-
tial to its effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should be per-
ceived as independent, as well as impartial ...".
21. W. Renke, "Invoking Independence: Judicial Independence as a No-cut Wage Guaran-
tee" (Edmonton: Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta Faculty of
Law, 1994) at 5.
22. J.R. Thiberge Lte v. Syndicat national des employds de l'aluminum d'Arvida Inc.,
[1966] S.C.R. 378 at 382. The court also concludes that they neither exercise purely
executive nor legislative functions.
23. See, e.g.: Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 at 185; or Re Canada (Anti-Dump-
ing Tribunal), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 739 at 742.
24. H.N. Janisch, "Independence of Administrative Tribunals: In Praise of "Structural Her-
etics" (1987) 1 C.JA.LP. I at 3.
25. Ibid. at 3. See, also: M. Rankin, "Perspectives on the Independence of Administrative
Tribunals" (1992) 6 C.J.A.LP. 91 at 92; R.S. Abella, "The Independence of Adminis-
trative Tribunals" (1992) 26 Law Soc. Gaz 113 at 116; and Canada, Law Reform Com-
mission, Independent Administrative Agencies (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1980) at 75.
26. (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
27. Quebec (A.G.) v. Blaike, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 at 1028.
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system, if the public perception of the independence of an administrative,
adjudicative process is strong, unsuccessful participants in the process will
generally respect it nonetheless, despite their particular disapproval with a
decision made. It also follows that if the legitimacy of an agency is brought into
question (because of questions concerning its impartiality) in one instance,
deleterious effects may be felt throughout the entire system of administrative
justice.2
8
Without this legitimacy, derived from an earned reputation for independent
behaviour, a board that is required by statute to reach its decision in an impartial
manner will no longer be perceived as anything more than a conduit for
transmitting the will of the government of the day.29
Abella notes that both governments and independent agencies have "a sphere
of legitimate power and influence. '' 30 The government or legislature make the
rules and the adjudicator applies them. It is in the best interests of both (for the
smooth operation of the statutory regime) that the integrity of each sphere is
respected. Integrity is reinforced by the aforementioned perception of indepen-
dence, and through the proper functioning of the administrative scheme in
question. The agency provides decision-making in a de-politicised atmosphere,
thereby permitting delegation (from the politicians) of many unpopular deci-
sions - such as whether to provide social assistance, or the adjudication of their
appeals. 31
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has identified eight values to which
independent agency structures and procedures should confirm32: (1) account-
ability; (2) effectiveness, economy and efficiency [in executing the agency's
statutory mandate]; (3) fairness [in the overall interest of social cohesion]; (4)
integrity [that the purported decision-makers are also the de facto decision-mak-
ers]; (5) authoritativeness [that decisions assume an air of finality]; (6) princi-
pled decision-making [in the interest of correctness and accuracy]; (7)
comprehensibility [process transparency]; and (8) openness [accessibility]. This
statement of values provides a useful checklist against which goals such as
agency independence can be measured. For example, achieving and maintaining
institutional independence primarily supports the values of fairness - by
legitimising the process designed to achieve the statutory mandate - and
28. Ranldn, supra, note 25 at 94; and Abella, supra, note 25 at 113.
29. Ibid. at 92.
30. Abella, supra, note 25 at 117.
31. Rankin, supra, note 25 at 92.
32. Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra, note 25 at 13-15.
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integrity. Conversely, overt political pressure - even if only intended to
maximise the effectiveness, economy and efficiency of the process - serves to
weaken application of these values. Reference to these values will be made
throughout the remainder this paper.
The SARB
The SARB's mandate "is to provide an independent review of administrative
decisions, and thereby ensure that the social assistance provided for people in
need operates fairly and in accordance with the law."'33 This role is particularly
important because, in deciding whether to provide, withhold, or terminate social
assistance, administrators are exercising de facto discretion (i.e. the discretion
that inevitably comes through interpretation of statutory language). 34 This
discretion is complicated by the complex nature of the statutory and regulatory
provisions of the province's social assistance regime, and by its frequent
amendment. 35 Of course, administrations have developed policies to assist in
structuring discretion (whether de facto, or explicitly authorised through per-
missive statutory wording), but such policies have neither the force, nor the
legitimacy and accountability, of a law or regulation. If the application of a
policy adversely affects a recipient, she or he has recourse to the SARB. In
conducting a de novo review, the SARB also provides the recipient with an
objective, and usually thorough, review, which might provide for better case-
by-case decision-making than can be maintained by social assistance adminis-
trations which must process a much higher volume of cases within a short period
of time.36
While institutional independence is intended to support the resolution of social
assistance disputes within the traditional legal paradigm (where there are two
equal parties and an impartial adjudicator), the reality that less than one third of
claimants 37 are represented presents a practical problem. One of the specialised
duties of SARB decision-makers, as well as the SARB staff, is therefore to
33. Ontario, Social Assistance Review Board, 1993-94 Annual Report (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1994) at 9.
34. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Government Agencies, "Report
on Agencies, Boards and Commissions (No. 8)" 4th Session, 32nd Parliament (1994) at
20. The SARB's jurisdiction is both to interpret legislation (or delegated legislation) as
required (addressing the use of de facto discretion), and to review the exercise of
express statutory discretion, where it exists.
35. Maureen Adams, supra, note 11 at 136.
36. The SARB is currently receiving approximately 12000 to 13000 notices of appeal per
year. This represents only 1.8% of the caseload handled by the province's social assis-
tance administrations. Maureen Adams, supra, note 11 at 140-1.
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communicate with appellants in such as a manner as to facilitate the articulation
of their claims. 38 To further accommodate claimants, SARB hearings are usually
relatively informal and are often conducted in surroundings that are less intim-
idating than those of a court. These characteristics are exactly the kind of feature
that distinguishes a tribunal such as the SARB from a court, and yet reinforces
its independence (as an expert adjudicator) 3 9 at the same time.40
Though always a matter of negotiation (and therefore subject to more uncer-
tainty than the administration of a court), the SARB's relationship with the
Government has been regulated, each year, by a memorandum of understanding
between it, the Ministry of Community and Social Services, and the Manage-
ment Board of Cabinet, that is to be tabled in the Legislature. The memorandum
essentially sets the SARB's budget, and allows its Chair to determine how its
resources should be employed. In the past, the institutionalised character of the
agreement required to produce the memorandum lent a degree of certainty to
the administration of an independent agency such as the SARB. 4 1 Achieving
firm control through the execution of a memorandum allowed the Chairperson
37. Ibid.
38. Joanne Leach, Senior Counsel and Manager, Legal Unit, Ontario Social Assistance
Review Board, telephone interview (19 April 1996).
39. While I have referred to the SARB as an expert tribunal, it is important to note that this
characterisation has not led the Courts to view its decisions as deserving judicial defer-
ence. Rather than allowing the SARB to make any decision it sees fit to make, so long
as the result is not patently unreasonable, the Court will require the SARB to be correct
in its interpretation. See: Wedekind v. Ontario (Ministry of Community & Social Ser-
vices) (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.); app'l den'd. S.C.C. File no. 24564, S.C.C. Bul-
letin, 1995, p. 1086. However, it should nonetheless be noted that, in finding that the
SARB did not deserve curial deference, the Court of Appeal based its decision (at least
partially) on the conclusion that review on a "reasonableness" standard would produce
the same result as would the application of a rule of interpretation that social welfare
legislation, where ambiguous, should be read in favour of the social welfare recipient.
While the Court of Appeal's conclusion arguably misapplies the standard of patent
unreasonableness (suggesting that review based on this standard requires the court con-
sider the reasonableness of a board's decision, rather than simply determine whether the
decision is rationally connected to the board's authority to make it), it leaves the door
open for the Court to choose the SARB's interpretation whenever the merits of the case
demand such a result (through application of this rule of interpretation).
40. These features were also called for by a previous subcommittee examining the SARB.
Supra, note 34 at 25.
41. Supra, note 34 at 25. However, approximately nine months into the reign of the new
Government, a new memo had not been negotiated. See: Debates, supra note 36 at 141.
The result is probably uncertainty for the administration of the SARB, and - to some
degree - uncertainty as to its continued independence.
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of the SARB to address the effectiveness, economy, and efficiency of its
administrative process in manners that did not conflict with more important
values, such as fairness and openness.
For example, between 1990 and 1995, appeals to the SARB increased 170%. In
response to this overwhelming increase in caseload, a number of measures were
implemented, including: the institution of one-person panels; a short decision
format; computerised scheduling and decision-writing; teleconferencing for
simple, but remote, hearings; and case management.42 As a result, the SARB
attained a 180% increase in decision output over the same period. In 1995-1996,
the SARB instituted further measures to eliminate its backlog completely by the
second quarter of fiscal 1996 - despite a continued increase in appeals.
43
The significance of the SARB's recent successes in managing its caseload is
heightened by further consideration of its adjudicative role. Noting that the rules
(which the SARB must apply to individual, and often unique, findings of fact)
are "complex" is hardly sufficient. How should the issue of joint custody be
addressed where eligibility rules only contemplate single custody?44 What does
it mean to "live with" another person, in the context of determining eligibility
for single-parent social assistance? 45 Does the provision of R.R.O. 537, respect-
ing social assistance eligibility based on age, violate s. 15 of the Charter46 and
if so, is such justified in a free and democratic society?4 7 From determining the
42. It should also be noted that the SARB is advocating changes to the process managed by
the Government to further improve effectiveness, economy and efficiency. These
include: development of a consistent, province-wide, internal review system (to reduce
multiple appeals on the same issue); an earlier disclosure process; and a better record of
attendance by Ministry official at hearings (the respondent is represented in only 40%
of appeals). Ibid. at 136.
43. Ibid. at 135.
44. In Lauren v. Director. Income Maintenance Branch, Minister of Community and Social
Services (10 October 1995), Toronto 565/93 (Ont. Div. Ct) [unreported] and Wilkinson
v. Director, Income Maintenance Branch, Minister of Community and Social Services
(10 October 1995), Toronto 170/94 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported], the SARB's interpreta-
tion (overruling the policy of the Director) was wholeheartedly endorsed by the Divi-
sional Court.
45. In Nicolitsis v. Director, Income Maintenance Branch, Minister of Community and
Social Services (24 July 1995), Toronto 777/92 (Ont. Div. Ct) [unreported] and Arbour
v, Director, Income Maintenance Branch, Minister of Community and Social Services
(24 July 1995), Toronto 674/93 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported], the Court again preferred
the SARB interpretation over that of the administrators.
46. Supra, note 19.
47. See another decision endorsed by a majority of the Court: Mohamed v. General Man-
ager, Department of Social Services, Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto & Director,
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meaning of "shared accommodation" to considering how to calculate eligibility
based on net versus gross figures for Unemployment Insurance payments,48 the
SARB has become expert in interpreting social assistance legislation, and
frequently changing regulations, in a fair and expeditious manner.
The Political Environment
No discussion of institutional independence can be complete without reference
to the political environment within which an agency operates. Often, it is
particularly because of the political sensitivities of decision-making that the
independent body is created. (If only expertise was required, it could be provided
by a government department within the bounds of normal ministerial responsi-
bility). In the case of social assistance, the political environment has become a
crucial factor. While conventional wisdom suggests that the majority of citizens
support the idea of social assistance programmes,49 the present Government was
elected with a strong majority, and has retained sufficient support to win
another,50 despite - or perhaps, in part, because of51 - its extremist stance on
social assistance. 52 Some have suggested that this stance merely reflects popu-
Income Maintenance Branch, Minister of Community and Social Services (22 February
1996), Toronto 609/93 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported].
48. Supra, note 39 at 34.
49. For example, a Vector Research and Development December 1994 National Poll found
that 74% of Canadians would pay higher taxes if they were guaranteed that the money
was used to provide food and medical care for poor children. (May 1995) 2:1 Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives Monitor.
50. The most recent poll by the Angus Reid Group, (31 January 1997) reveals a 43% mar-
gin of support for the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, among those surveyed.
This level of support has largely remained stable over the past 18 months.
51. The results of a recent Insight Canada Poll, "Common Sense for Ontario" (December 2
1995), clearly indicate overall support for the new Government's policies with regard to
social assistance. For example over 85% of those surveyed agreed that there should be
"workfare for the able-bodied;" 85% agreed with requiring identification cards to
reduce welfare fraud; and over 76% agreed that "welfare benefits" should be reduced.
52. This stance is reflected in the policies of the Government, since its election, as well as
the errors of its representatives. See, e.g.: "The Ontario Axeman" Economist (16
December 1995) 40; "$90 a month enough for welfare diet Tories say" Toronto Star
(21 October 1995) A3 [This diet provides information for welfare recipients on how to
spend benefits on groceries. Scientific opinion regarding its sufficiency is mixed, but it
includes such elements as provision for eight servings of pasta, but no seasoning];
"1,289 Squeaky Wheels" [Toronto] Globe & Mail (20 January 1996) Dl [This article
outlines how the Government was failing to fully consult most interested parties in
much of its decision-making]; "Ontario Tories find workfare more difficult to imple-
ment" [Toronto] Globe & Mail (23 January 1996) A5 [Workfare, as a policy issue, was
The Ontario Social Assistance Review Board in 1997
list sentiments, and that even the previous social democratic Government could
be seen as having catered to them.53 Others recognise it as a shift in the manner
in which social assistance is conceived.
Professors Des Rosiers and Feldthusen advance two theories for-the provision
of social assistance: the "public largesse model" and the "citizen entitlement
model."'54 Under the former, social assistance is a matter of public charity, and
little more than a privilege for the recipient. Under the latter - which is arguably
the model upon which the Ontario social assistance regime has been based
55 -
the provision of social assistance is part of an obligation of the Government to
meet the basic human needs of all Ontario citizens.
56
It seems that, in subscribing to the populist concept of the "deserving" and
"undeserving" poor (i.e. the unlucky versus the lazy), 57 the current Government
a part of the Government's campaign platform.]; "Province's welfare rules penalise
'family help"' Toronto Star (12 October 1995) Al [Existing regulations do not permit
family assistance to recipients, though the Premier advised that such activity be encour-
aged.]; "Seniors, welfare recipients to pay user fees under drug benefits plan" [Toronto]
Globe & Mail (1 October 1995) A6 [Regulations have been amended to adopt user fees
for use of prescription drugs by recipients, though such measures violate a campaign
target for spending decreases.]; 'Tsubouchi rules out welfare earnings grab" Toronto
Star (4 October 1995) A9 [This article contains examples of dubious (if not patronis-
ing) advice provided by the Minister of Community and Social Services concerning
recipient grocery purchasing. "In fact, even if [a tin of tuna] is not priced at 69 cents [an
unrealistic expectation] quite often you can make a deal and get it for 69 cents. People
have to shop a little more wisely"]; "Welfare benefits cut 21.6%" [Toronto] Globe &
Mail (22 July 1995) A4; "Welfare crackdown targets housemates" Toronto Star (21
October 1995) Al; "Welfare snitch line yields uncertain results" Ottawa Citizen (23
April 1996) A3.
53. See: D. Cameron, "Welfare Politics" editorial, Canadian Forum (July/August 1995) 5
at 5-6. See also: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Government
Agencies, "Intended Appointments" in Debates, No. A-51 (7 September 1994) at 1001.
54. N. Des Rosiers & B. Feldthusen, "Discretion in Social Assistance Legislation" (1992) 8
J. Law & Soc. Pol'y. 204 at 210.
55. Ibid., referring to: Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions, sum-
mary, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988) at 9, 11-12. Moreover, the wording of the legis-
lation, supra, notes 3-5, establishes entitlements under which the administrator is
obligated to satisfy if certain requirements are met. See, e.g. GWAA s. 7. "A municipal
welfare administrator shall [emphasis added] provide assistance in accordance with the
regulations to any person in need who resides in the municipality and who is eligible
for such assistance." The discretion of the administrator lies only in determining eligi-
bility within the strictly prescribed bounds of the regulation R.R.O. 537.
56. See, generally: J. Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
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of Ontario 58 has undertaken a policy course that is contrary to the entitlement
model reflected in legislation, and has embraced the largesse model instead. The
significance of this policy shift cannot be underestimated. If, in its rush to
implement this new policy, the Government fosters an adjudicatory system
which lacks the functional trappings of independence, it is submitted that the
public's perception of its impartiality may wane.
Independence and the Appointments Process
A number of elements have been advocated for the success of the independent
administrative agency. While no two agencies are alike - and the degree of
institutional independence of any particular one may vary due to the great
diversity of functions exercised by them 59 - these elements are most commonly
put forward: sufficiency of tenure (both in length and security of appointment);
a predetermined, rigorous appointment process; adequate compensation;
immunity from civil proceedings for actions taken in good faith; and exclusivity
of employment / responsibilities. 60
Whether one accepts tribunals as being an aid to or implementer of public policy,
it is crucial that they be seen as credible by the parties who rely on their
decisions. And one of the ways they are seen as credible is if their appointments
are made in a way which reflects respect for their independence. If the appoint-
ments to tribunals are made without sensitivity to the objective qualifications
of the appointees, or bear little or no relationship to the needs of the tribunal,
both the motives of the appointing body and the decisions of the tribunal become
suspect.
6 1
57. See: L.A. Jacobs, "What Are the Normative Foundations of Workfare?" Policy Options
(May 1995) 10. See, also: I. Morrison & G. Pearce, "Under the Axe: Social Assistance
in Ontario in 1995" (1995), 11 J. Law & Soc. Pol'y. 1.
58. Harris, supra, note 18 at 35. "Our benefit reduction plan is aimed at ensuring that social
assistance (with all the related drug plans and dental benefits) is not more attractive
than honest work - while fairly recognising the need to support those temporarily
unable to support themselves."
59. Energy Probe v. Atomic Energy Control Board, [1985] 1 F.C. 563; 15 D.L.R. (4th) 48
at 64 (C.A.); app'l. ref'd. (1985), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 48n (S.C.C.).
60. See: Rankin, supra, note 25 at 110; Janisch, supra note 19 at 2-4; W.J. Atkinson, "The
Independence and Impartially of Administrative Tribunals After the Charter" in N.R.
Finklestein & B.M. Rogers, eds., Administrative Tribunals and the Charter (Toronto:
Carswell, 1990) 87 at 94-95; Ratushny et al, The Independence of Federal Administra-
tive Tribunals and Agencies (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1990); and W. Renke,
"Invoking Independence: Judicial Independence as a No-cut Wage Guarantee"
(Edmonton: Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta Faculty of Law,
1994).
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While it should not be concluded that a poor appointment process makes for
poor appointees, the effect of a purely partisan - or otherwise inappropriate -
appointment "all too often attaches sadly and lingeringly to the tribunal's
reputation."' 62 While difficult to quantify, the public perception of independence
is certainly fragile. In 1983, the SARB had a reputation for members chosen for
their party affiliations, rather than their abilities. 63 It also had a undistinguished
reputation with overseeing courts regarding its decision-making. 64
By 1989, following a review of Ontario's regulatory agencies, a number of
recommendations had been adopted that altered the way appointments had been
handled. 65 In particular, a secretariat within the Premier's office was tasked to
seek out potential agency candidates (including candidates for SARB positions)
and to participate in the interview process. The chair of an agency would be
consulted prior to appointment or re-appointment of a member, and the chair
would be responsible for review and recommendation of the candidate's perfor-
mance. 66 In fact, in the case of the SARB, its chair (or a designated representa-
tive) was included as an interviewer, and the SARB became active in recruiting
interested parties. 67
61. Abella, supra, note 25 at 115.
62. Ibid. at 116.
63. "Board unfair, insensitive to poor, critics say" [Toronto] Globe & Mail (2 February
1983) 4.
64. Infra note 72.
65. R.W. Macaulay, Directions: A Report to the Management Board of Cabinet (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1989) at 8-31 - 68-43.
66. This system, adopted under the Liberal Government (1985-1990), was maintained for
the duration of the NDP Government (1990-1995). Moreover, a proactive appoint-
ments policy was encouraged for the secretariat and, for the SARB in particular, candi-
dates were sought for their'expertise in relation to reducing the SARB's backlog of
cases. Pat Daly, former Chief of Staff to the Ontario Minister of Community and Social
Services, telephone interview (25 April 1996).
67. The last three appointments reviewed by legislative committee are instructive of the
SARB's finding proper people. Charinee J. De Silva, a community legal clinic counsel,
applied and was interviewed, but was not chosen. Two years later, she was contacted,
re-interviewed and selected. See: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee
on Government Agencies, "Intended Appointments" in Debates, No. A-51 (7 Septem-
ber 1994) at 833. Janis Sarra, a long time member of the Pay Equity Tribunal and Lab-
our Board (appointments made by previous governments), was contacted by the SARB
about a part time position many months after her initial expression of interest. See:
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Government Agencies,
"Intended Appointments" in Debates, No. A-57 (5 October 1994) at 999. Judy Aikman-
Springer, a community legal clinic counsel, applied, was interviewed, and chosen. See:
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Unfortunately, the new Government seems to have forsaken a process that had
apparently sought out those with expertise relevant to SARB adjudication, (at
least) in addition to partisan affiliation. Far from being interviewed or consulted
concerning appointments, the last Chair68 was told that the SARB's empty
positions would remain empty in order to reduce costs, only to find the positions
filled a short time later.69 Three of the four new appointees are said to have run
as candidates for the same party as that of the new Government, 70 and one of
the appointees was reputed to have expressed many strong views regarding
social assistance policy, as well as towards members of distinct groups likely to
appear before the SARB as claimants.71 In fact, at least one appointee was not
even interviewed for the position. 72 Regardless of how these new appointees
perform, 73 the public perception of SARB independence - the clearly partisan
nature of these appointments - cannot be said to have been strengthened.
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Government Agencies,
"Intended Appointments" in Debates, No. A-58 (6 October 1994) at 1054.
68. Her resignation was accepted, and her appointment terminated early, through O.C.
2471/96.
69. "Tory candidate appointed to welfare board" Toronto Star (11 October 1995) A14.
70. Pat Daly, supra, note 66.
71. See, generally: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Government
Agencies, "Intended Appointments" in Debates, No. A-5 (13 December 1995) at 61-
65. These alleged statements include: "The plain fact is that some of us don't want to
pay $2500 for a social service funeral" alleged by M.P.P. David Cooke (at 61) to have
been stated at a meeting of the Thunder Bay City Council. Another example attributed
to Ms. Dodds by M.P.P. Bruce Crozier (at 64), was: "single mothers living in sub-
sidised housing who allow their boyfriends or ex-husbands to move in; this is tanta-
mount to a subsidised bordello." Crozier noted that the statement had been reported in
an article by J. Coyle in the Ottawa Citizen, on October 13, 1995. Ms. Dodds suggested
(at 61 and 64) that these quotations were being used improperly out of context. M.P.P.
Peter Kormos also noted in his questioning of Ms. Dodds (at 65), that she was a strong
supporter of an English-only by-law in Thunder Bay, Ontario (as city alderman), and
that she supported the view that "child benefit programs will encourage social assis-
tance recipients to have more children," a statement attributed to her in the Thunder Bay
Chronicle Journal on July 9, 1993. Because Mr. Kormos did not disclose whether the
quotation was direct, Ms, Dodds did not answer whether she agreed with the statement
(at 65). However, Ms. Dodds did acknowledge (at 63) that she fully endorsed the
Government's election platform that resulted in a 21.6% cut to welfare rates following
its victory.
72. Ibid. at 60. After having submitted a resume following her failed bid to be elected to the
Legislature, Ms. Dodds stated that she was contacted by the Premier's office and sim-
ply offered the position.
73. And they appear to have been performing their roles well thus far. Joanne Leach, supra
note 38.
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Of course, it has also been suggested that the previous governments' having
sought out those with experience in the social welfare policy or advocacy fields
itself created more than an apprehension of bias, but an actual bias in favour of
those who appear to the SARB. 74 The evidence of this bias, it has been
suggested,75 lays in the SARB's high rate of allowing appeals (recently reported
by former SARB Chair Adams as being approximately 50% for all appeals heard
over the past few years76). Four points should be made in response to this
position. First,77 simply because an individual is demonstrated to have experi-
ence in dealing with a particular segment of society does not lead to the
conclusion that she is biased. It simply suggests that she may be better informed
than those without similar experience. However, whereas bias cannot be per-
ceived from experience alone, it can certainly be perceived in statements made
publicly about a certain issue or segment of society.
Second, there is very little utility in attempting to tally the relative successes
and failures before a particular tribunal, because there are simply too many
variables in play in every adjudication. One such variable, not mentioned by
those who have made this argument, is the difference in result depending upon
whether the applicant to the SARB is represented, or is proceeding alone. Third,
focusing exclusively on the appointments' process is not useful in determining
the degree of institutional independence enjoyed by a tribunal. While the
appointments' process may be edifying in this regard, and certain minimum legal
standards must be met,78 other factors may be equally as important. 79 Finally,
while it may be true that some see appointments of social assistance advocates
74. E.R. Sabatini, Welfare + No Fair: A Critical Analysis of Ontario's Welfare System
(1985-1994) (Vancouver. Fraser Institute, 1996) ch. 2.
75. Ibid at 43. However, the arguments set out in this tract are lacking in legal analysis
regarding independence. In fact, the author demonstrates a surprising lack of legal anal-
ysis throughout the chapter. For example, at 48-49, he is highly critical of the notion
that an adjudicatory tribunal can interpret the Charter in reference to its constituting
legislation and the case before it. He incorrectly refers the SARB's conclusion that it
can do so (supra, note 47) as an attempt to expand its jurisdiction. No mention of the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations
Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, respecting the jurisdiction of a tribunal to hear and deter-
mine Charter issues, is made.
76. Maureen Adams, supra, note 11 at 140-141. Sabatini, ibid. at 38-43, disputes this fig-
ure as underestimating the actual rate of appeals allowed by the SARB.
77. This argument was provided by Professor Janet Mosher.
78. Supra, note 21.
79. It should be noted that in the case of the SARB, changes to the appointments' process
followed upon the administrative changes which have been attributed to the SARB's
improved decision-making.
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to a social assistance review board as creating apprehension of bias, more so
than appointments of those with no such expertise and strong views in favour
of the government of the day, it is submitted that the appointments' process
should be guided by the same principles as those governing interpretation of
social welfare legislation - namely, that one should err on the side which
favours the recipient, for it is the recipient who is, by definition, in need of
assistance.80
Independence and Court Supervision
Abella has charged that court supervision represents a threat - albeit more
qualitative than quantitative - to the independence of an administrative tribu-
nal.81 This is so because the manner in which a court regards the capacity and
jurisdiction of a particular tribunal significantly affects the reputation of the
tribunal with its constituent groups - the legal profession, the legislature, and
interest groups. In short, a few negative reviews can seriously impair the
perceived value of authoritativeness in tribunal decision-making. 82
While Abella goes on to explain the problem of lack of deference by courts to
tribunals through examination of the "generalist" judicial mind set, and a legal
culture amenable to interference with non-curial decision-making, 83 it must be
noted that importing basic legal principles, found in the common law rules of
natural justice, can be a positive step, so long as the court is mindful of the
agency's institutional differences and the (often) unique context of its decision-
making. In review of SARB decisions on appeal, the Divisional Court appears
to have employed this approach, ensuring that basic legal principles will be
respected in its decision-making. 84 While such strenuous review may initially
weaken the functional independence of the SARB, inviting appellants to not
regard its decisions as particularly determinative, it is submitted that if the
Court's criticisms are accepted and acted upon, they may be used to strengthen
the legitimacy of SARB decision-making. 85
80. Kerr v. Metropolitan Toronto (Department of Social Services) (1991), 4 Q.R. (3d) 430
at 445 (Div. Ct.); cited with approval in Wedekind, supra, note 39 at 297.
81. Supra, note 25 at 118.
82. Rankin, supra, note 25 at 91-92.
83. Supra, note 25 at 119-120.
84. Section 15 of the FBA (ref'd to in GWAA and VRSA) provides for appeals to the Divi-
sional Court on a question that is not a question of fact alone, within a 30 day time
limit. Decisions are also subject to judicial review under s. 2 of the Judicial Review
Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1.
85. In its recommendations for changes to the SARB appeal process, the authors of Transi-
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Faced with a series of stinging rebukes by the Divisional Court for its poor
decision-making,8 6 and fierce criticism from concerned interest groups for the
appointment of untrained members and their inappropriate queries during hear-
ings, 87 the SARB was reformed between 1987 and 1989, just prior to the time
its appointments' process was improved. The most notable improvements were
the addition of a professional legal unit and the institution of a member training
programme. The substantive value of these administrative additions - in the
realization of functional independence - cannot be underestimated. Regular
legal unit review of decisions, five-week training sessions for new members,
ongoing seminars (and presumably better selection of candidates) has turned the
reputation of the SARB around within less than a decade.88 While by no means
indicative of the quality of its overall decision-making, it may be worth noting
that, in the past year and a half, the SARB has not experienced a reversal by the
tions, supra, note 55 at 62, suggested improvements which seem to conform with the
court's approach to applying basic legal principles to ensure that natural justice is
observed: "The SARB has been severely and properly criticised for its procedures, the
content of its decisions, and its lack of impartiality. Notwithstanding a number of recent
improvements, the procedures of the board fall far short of those required in light of the
serious decisions it makes. Board members should be highly qualified, well trained, and
effectively supported by in-house counsel. More decisions should be appealable, the
right to legal representation should be guaranteed, and there should be full disclosure of
all relevant information. The rules of evidence should be followed, and a complete
record of the evidence should be available. Adequate reasons should be given for all
decisions, with rehearings permitted only in exceptional cases. These are only some of
the improvements to the appeal process that we see as a high priority."
86. See, e.g.: Re Warwick v. Ministry of Community and Social Services (1978), 21 O.R.
(2d) 528; 91 D.L.R. (3d) 131 (C.A.); Re Willis v. Ministry of Community and Social
Services (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 287; Dowlut v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and
Social Services) (1985), 8 O.A.C. 136; 11 Admin. L.R. 54 (Div. Ct.); Re Warwick v.
Ministry of Community and Social Services (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 302 (Div. Ct.); Re
Pins v. Director of Family Benefits Branch, Ministry of Community and Social Services
(1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 302 (Div. Ct.); and Re Burton v. Ministry of Community and
Social Services (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 211 (Div. Ct.).
87. Supra, note 63.
88. Leach, supra, note 38. In fact, the SARB training manual is used as a basis for the train-
ing materials of the Ontario Society of Adjudicators and Regulators. See, also: Adams,
supra note 11 at 136-9, and 149. "Our goal in the training program at the board is to
talk in depth and at length about the impartiality and neutrality of decision-making,
about the biases that one brings to the tribunal to be set aside and to decide the issue
before you based on the evidence and the facts that you hear at the hearing. That's his-
torically been a difficult transition for some people at the board. There's legal protec-
tion for that... judicial review." Adams also mentioned that the SARB maintains an
internal line of communication for those who wish to raise issues of bias immediately
upon completion of a hearing.
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Division Court, despite the difficulty of some of the decisions before it.89 Just
as poor decision-making can weaken a reputation and the degree of indepen-
dence granted through deference, the addition of proper administrative measures
can bolster decision-quality, reflecting in enhanced reputation and solidified
independence (i.e. freedom of a decision-maker from the constraint of court
interference). 90
The SARB, Its Would-be Alternative, and Judicial Review
Numerous improvements in SARB administration have restored its reputation
and re-gained it some degree of functional independence within its statutory
process of appeal. However, the recent developments in the new Government's
appointments' process, and its new policy direction, may result in a weakening
of the SARB's legitimacy. Given these developments, it would not be surprising
to hear a recipient of social assistance casually question the impartiality of one
of the new appointees, even though each has had access to reputedly excellent
training. If a recipient wishes to act upon such concern, the official avenue for
it is the process of judicial review.91
When a human being is placed in the position of judging the fates of other
human beings, the credibility of the decision rendered will largely rest upon
the impartiality of the decision-maker. If even the appearance of self-inter-
est is construed by the affected parties, any wisdom previously evident in
the ruling will immediately become tainted. All affected parties must be
assured that the judge, under whose judgement they must live, had no per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy.92
(a) Individual Bias
The common law principles which make up the so-called "laws of natural
justice" are that parties before a tribunal are entitled to a disinterested and
unbiased observer, and that they are entitled to a right to be heard. From the
former principle is drawn the test for bias: "what would an informed person,
89. Supra, notes 43-47. In fact, it seems quite common for the Divisional Court to quote
the SARB at length in its approval of decisions.
90. It is interesting to note that most of Wood's criticism and questioning of the Adams
during committee review concerned his apparent dislike for the quality and legal review
programmes employed by SARB to ensure the release of high-quality decisions. Supra,
note 11 at 136.
91. This option was noted by former Chair Adams, for those decision-makers who were
unable to check their biases at the door. Supra, note 88.
92. D.P. Cofer, "The Question of Independence Continues: Administrative Law Judges
within the Social Security Administration" (1986) 69 Judicature 228 at 228.
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viewing the matter realistically and practically - and having thought the matter
through - conclude? 93 Bias is the functional antecedent of impartiality.
Impartiality is the end towards which independence is the means.
(b) Institutional bias
To suggest that judicial review is available for cases of the apprehension of bias,
on the part of a particular member, is to relay only half of the story. "The
objective status of the tribunal can be as relevant for the 'impartiality' require-
ment as it is for 'independence.' Therefore, whether or not any particular judge
harboured pre-conceived ideas or biases, if the system is structured in such a
way as to create a reasonable apprehension of bias on an institutional level, the
requirement of impartiality is not met."'94 The test for institutional bias, there-
fore, becomes whether the same well-informed, "reasonable" person would
conclude that a presumption of bias exists, if presented with a substantial
number of cases. 95
It would be useful, at this point, to recall how the classification of a tribunal's
function is relevant for a determination of its independence. 96 The more a
tribunal acts like a court, the more the requirements of procedural justice
affecting it will resemble those of a court. 97 Moreover, the standard of proce-
dural justice applied to ensure impartiality should be strict because the matter
at issue is one which could conceivably involve a breach of s. 7 of the Charter,
the right to fundamental justice. 98 Recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions
93. Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; 68
D.L.R. (3d) 716 at 735.
94. Ruffo v. Conseil de la Magistrature (1995), 130 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 19 (S.C.C.).
95. Ibid. at 20.
96. Supra, notes 24 & 25.
97. See: Rufo, supra, note 94; and Newfoundland Telephone Company v. The Board of
Commissioners of Public Utilities, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623 at 634-39; 89 D.L.R. (4th) 289
at 296-99.
98. While no Ontario Court has yet to find that s. 7 affords any protection for welfare rights
(see, e.g.: Fernandes v. Director of Social Services (1992), 7 Admin. L.R. (2d) 153 at
166; Falkiner v. Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No.
3737 (October 29 1996) (Q.L.) (Gen. Div.); Masse v. Ontario (Minister of Community
and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363 (February 8 1996) (Q.L.) (Gen. Div.)), it may
yet be successfully argued that s. 7 protects the "security of the person," which includes
protection of the capacity to satisfy basic human needs, such as food and shelter. While
it may not provide a substantive right, it could confer a procedural right not to be
deprived of social assistance that might otherwise be forthcoming under statute. See:
R.A. MacDonald, "Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural
Justice and Fundamental Justice" (1987) 39 U. Fla. L Rev. 217 at 249; Singh v. Min. of
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concerning interpretation of a similar section to s. 7 in the Qu6bec Charter
indicate that the Charter might yet become an added element in determinations
of issues and independence and impartiality for administrative tribunals.99
The forgoing analysis indicates that courts will provide rather close scrutiny to
an adjudicative tribunal - such as the SARB - if it is engaged in the finding
of fact, to which statutory rules are interpreted and applied, in the determination
of an individualised complaint concerning the provision of social assistance,
particularly where provision is made by statute for a right of appeal. What are
the chances for a successful application for judicial review based on an allega-
tion of individual bias against any of the new appointees? The most recent
decisions on individual bias in Ontario seem to indicate that general statements
about an issue area, however inflammatory, would not be sufficient - in the
mind of the mythical reasonable person10 -to raise an apprehension of bias. 101
Are the chances for a finding of institutional bias any better?
The fact of the matter is, this board is in a mess. It takes one year from the
start of an appeal to a decision. We need people like [new appointee] Eve-
lyn Dodds to fix that mess. She supports the government agenda, and that's
what we need on the board.102
While appointments of those who are apparent adherents to the "public largesse"
model of social assistance may speak to their perceived bias as individual
decision-makers, such appointments also speak to institutional impartiality. The
Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 206-7. Note also that Reference
Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 512, requires a s. 7 analysis to take
account of the basic tenants of common law [such as audi alteram partem] and the rule
of law [impartiality being a prerequisite for the actualisation of the rule of law], supra,
notes 20-21.
99. See: Lippi, supra, note 18 at 531-532. See also, Ruffo, supra note 91 - where consid-
eration of s. 7 and an equivalent section (s. 12) of the Qudbec Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, are assumed to have application in determination of
issues of impartiality in a disciplinary tribunal; and 2747-3174 Quibec Inc. v. Quebec
(Rigie des permis d'alcool), [1996] S.C.J. No. 112 (21 November 1996) (Q.L.); rev'g
(1994) 122 D.L.R. (4th) 553 (Quebec C.A.) - where the same reasoning was extended
by the majority to the determination of a provincial liquor board to revoke a license.
100. One wonders why the test is not whether a reasonable and well-informed social assis-
tance recipient perceives bias.
101. See: E.A. Mining v. Ontario Securities Commission (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.); or
Large v. Stratford (City) (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 104 at 108-9; rev'd on other grounds.
102. Bob Wood, supra, note 11 at 67, speaking for Ms. Dodds, whose appointment was
strongly opposed by each non-government representative on the legislative committee
(a rarity in the last decade of appointments to the SARB) FN the HANSARD too.
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Government has apparently dispensed with a more transparent system of
appointments for a closed, partisan one which involves no real opportunity for
consultation with the SARB, much less with members of interested policy
communities. 103 Implicitly accepting a model of social assistance that runs
contrary to the purposes of the existing legislation - one based on the notion
that social assistance is simply a form of public largesse, rather than a necessary
societal entitlement 104 - the Government won an election with a platform that
included an oft-spoken policy against the preservation of the existing social
assistance scheme. Moreover, since its election, the Government has demon-
strated little sympathy for alternative viewpoints in its - sometimes flawed -
execution of that policy. 105 Bob Wood, Legislative Assistant to the Management
Board Chairman, has publicly placed the SARB on notice that he feels that the
Small Claims Court could possibly do its job more efficiently. 106 However, these
indicia are probably not sufficient either, in and of themselves, to lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the SARB might decide a number of cases
differently than it otherwise would have, in order to appease the Government.
The analysis becomes more interesting, however, when one acknowledges that
the additional charge of the individual bias of a new appointee might colour (and
therefore augment) the argument for institutional bias. While such arguments
might be phrased in the alternative, they are more likely (if argued well) to be
evaluated together. The analysis becomes even more interesting if one considers
the alternative scheme that has been posited by Mr. Wood. The alternative
suggested for the SARB is a private arbitrator, 107 with no expertise, per se,108
but with a clear adjudicative function.
The position would be a contracted one. Therefore either the individual arbitra-
tor, or the arbitration firm for whom she works, is subject to a short- or
medium-length term, and possibly provisional, contract. Unlike a SARB
appointment, which provides for a renewable term of three years in statute, 109
103. Supra, notes 69-72.
104. Supra, note 58.
105. Supra, note 52.
106. Supra, note 14.
107. Leave aside the obvious problems in applying an arbitration model to SARB decision-
making (i.e. that the arbitration model assumes two equal parties and a legal issue
which involves little consideration of the policy-development implicit in the exercise of
discretion under social assistance legislation).
108. This is a common basis for curial deference. See, generally: T.J. Weiler, "Curial Defer-
ence and NAFTA Panel Review" 1 J. Int'l. LgL Stds. 83.
109. MCSSA, s. 15.
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the new adjudicator would most likely be dismissable at pleasure 1o (perhaps
with the promise of damages in contract for premature breach). Unlike the
SARB, the new agency may enjoy its position by virtue of a regulation, but more
than likely it would be by virtue of an order in council or by simple contract
with the crown. It probably would not exist by operation of a statute. Finally,
the new adjudicator would be seen as mindful of the demise of the SARB, with
its 50/50 ratio of rulings in favour of a claims that proceeded to a hearing. 111
Would the reasonably well-informed, thoughtful, bystander perceive the poten-
tial for bias in a number of cases? Would the bystander conclude that the private
arbitrator, mindful of reaching his performance targets for numbers of applica-
tions processed (as stipulated, most likely, in his arbitration contract), be as
disposed to ensuring that unrepresented social welfare recipients are treated with
either substantive, or procedural, fairness - as would the SARB? It is submitted
that, if this alternative to the SARB becomes a reality, institutional independence
will become a very real concern.
CONCLUSION
The subject of independence crosses disciplinary boundaries, involving politics,
law, and administration. It supports the function of impartiality, which in turn
supports the foundations of the rule of law. Recent developments in Ontario
suggest that the Government no longer regards the provision of social assistance
as a matter of entitlement, and if it does, it seems to consider the pursuit of
effectiveness, economy, and efficiency as superior to ensuring respect for other
procedural values - whether they be fairness, integrity or authoritativeness in
decision-making.
It has been suggested by some within the legal community that the Ontario
government is systematically destroying the basis of politically independent
adjudication through its clearly partisan approach to the appointments process.
It has also been suggested that whatever happens to the SARB may be seen as
a touchstone for our commitment, as a society, not only to independence and
impartiality in adjudication, but to justice in a larger sense. 112
110. In Ontario Realty Corp, supra note 3, appointment at pleasure was argued as a ground
to find lack of institutional independence, and therefore reasonable apprehension of
bias. Similarly, control of the tenure and remuneration of a tribunal's member was
cause for a finding of a lack of institutional independence by a majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3 at
56-59.
111. Supra, note 76.
112. These ideas were contributed by Ian Morrison, Director of the Ontario Legal Clinic
The Ontario Social Assistance Review Board in 1997
Nonetheless, the Government was elected by a majority of the population, and
its agenda, short-sighted though it may be, was well-known. It may therefore
eliminate the SARB, and throw over the "citizen entitlement model" through
which it was created. But if it does so, the government should be ready to respond
to complaints that the new system lacks institutional independence, and it must
also be ready to accept that its alternative system, and the values it will represent,
will most likely be far from just.
Resource Office. This contribution, and his other thoughtful comments, are much
appreciated.
